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Abstract
We follow the duopoly framework with differentiated products as
in Singh and Vives (1984) and Zanchettin (2006) and examine the
welfare effects of a merger between two asymmetric firms. We find
that for quantity competition, the merger increases total welfare if the
cost asymmetry falls into a specific range. Furthermore, this parameter
range widens if the products are closer substitutes. On the other hand,
mergers are never welfare enhancing in this setting when firms compete
in prices.
JEL Classification: L11, L12
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we focus on differentiated goods and derive the analytical
condition for a merger to enhance welfare. The possibility of welfare en-
hancing merger is not new. Textbook examples show that for homogenous
goods, when the cost difference is substantial, a merger can increase social
welfare by improving allocative efficiency in the Cournot equilibrium. In a
homogenous product set-up, Farrell and Shapiro (1990) provide sufficient
∗Flavio Menezes acknowledges the financial support of the Australian Research Council
(Grant DP 0663768). We thank Luke Boosey for useful comments.
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conditions for profitable mergers to raise welfare with general demand and
cost conditions.
We follow the set up in Singh and Vives (1984) and Zanchettin (2006) and
derive the analytical condition for a merger to enhance welfare for markets
with differentiated products and asymmetric firms. Moreover, we obtain
the welfare enhancing condition for Cournot competition with homogenous
goods in the limit, i.e., as goods become perfect substitutes. In the same
framework, we show that if firms compete in prices, mergers always reduce
total welfare. The positive welfare effect of merger comes from improved
efficiency by allocating more output to the more efficient firm.
As Zanchettin (2006) points out, the efficient firm always produces more
under price competition than under quantity competition. It follows then
that the efficiency gains from a merger are lower under price competition
than under quantity competition. Moreover, unlike quantity competition,
the increase in profits due to efficiency gains under price competition is not
enough to outweigh the decline in consumer surplus from higher prices.
We present the model set up in the next section and solve first for the
optimisation problem the merged entity faces. Sections 3 and 4 analyse
the quantity competition and price competition games in turn and derive
the welfare results of mergers. While the main body of this paper deals
with substitute goods, Section 5 briefly discusses the case of complementary
goods. The final section provides some concluding remarks.
2 The Model
To facilitate comparison, we use the same notation as Zanchettin (2006).
Consider a two-sector model with one monopoly firm in each sector. The
inverse demand curves for the two goods are
p1 = α1 − (q1 + γq2) (1)
and
p2 = α2 − (γq1 + q2) . (2)
The parameter γ measures the degree of product differentiation. If γ = 0,
the demand for the two goods are independent. For the main body of the
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paper, we assume that the two goods are substitutes, 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1.
We assume that the marginal costs of production in markets 1 and 2 are
equal to c1 and c2, respectively, and that there are no fixed costs. Following
Zanchettin (2006), we define an index a to measure the asymmetry between
the two firms.
Definition 1 Let a ≡ (α1 − c1)− (α2 − c2) and α1 − c1 = 1. Without loss
of generality, assume a ≥ 0.
The index a summarises the asymmetry between the two markets and
firms. For a = 0, two firms are symmetric. For a ≥ 1 − γ2 , the asymmetry
between the firms is so large that firm 2 does not exert any competitive pres-
sure on firm 1, and in equilibrium firm 1 sets its quantity at the monopoly
level, q1 = qM1 , and q2 = 0. That is, the limit price required for firm 1 to
drive firm 2 out of the market is greater than the monopoly price firm 1
would like to charge at q2 = 0. This is explained in more detail in Sections 3
and 4 for quantity game and price game respectively. We focus on the case
a ≤ 1− γ2 in this paper.
Note that for the merged entity, without strategic interaction, setting
quantity is equivalent to setting price. Before analysing the duopoly game,
we solve the merged entity’s optimisation problem:
max
{Q1,Q2}
(p1 − c1)Q1 + (p2 − c2)Q2. (3)
The first order conditions yield
Q1 =
1− 2γQ2
2
and Q2 =
(1− a)− 2γQ1
2
. (4)
We will denote by Q the quantity choices of the merged entity and by q the
quantity choices of each of the firms when they are in competition.
For a < 1− γ, the solution is interior:
Q∗1 =
1− γ (1− a)
2 (1− γ2) and Q
∗
2 =
(1− a)− γ
2 (1− γ2) . (5)
This gives the merged entity’s profit equal to
Π =
1− 2γ (1− a) + (1− a)2
4 (1− γ) (1 + γ) , (6)
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and the resulting consumer surplus is
CS =
(1− a)2 − 2γ (1− a) + 1
8 (1 + γ) (1− γ) . (7)
For a ≥ 1− γ, the first order conditions yield Q∗2 = 0 and Q∗1 = 12 . The
merged firm profit is equal to 14 , and the consumer surplus is equal to
1
8 .
3 Quantity competition
If the two firms are in competition, each firm i solves maxqi (pi − ci) qi. This
yields the following best response function
qi =
αi − γqj − ci
2
, i, j = 1, 2. (8)
For a ≤ 1− γ2 , both firms produce positive output. This gives
qC1 =
2− γ (1− a)
4− γ2 and q
C
2 =
2 (1− a)− γ
4− γ2 . (9)
The resulting profits are
π1 =
(2− γ (1− a))2
(4− γ2)2
and π2 =
(2 (1− a)− γ)2
(4− γ2)2
. (10)
This gives consumer surplus
CS =
¡
4− 3γ2
¢
(1− a)2 + 2 (1− a) γ3 + 4− 3γ2
2 (γ + 2)2 (2− γ)2
. (11)
Notice that, as analysed above, for a ≥ 1−γ, the merged entity would choose
to produce only good 1. We plot the different cases, depending on whether
or not there is a corner solution, in the following diagram. Our analysis
focuses on cases 1 and 2. In particular, we will show that it is possible for
a merger to increase welfare in case 1.
3.1 Welfare Results
For the entire parameter range, as expected, industry profit always increases
and consumer surplus decreases after the merger. In any two-to-one merger,
the merged entity can always mimic the pre-merger behaviour of the firms
and, therefore, profits have to be (weakly) higher. For substitute goods, this
4
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Figure 1: Output equilibirum in (γ, a) space under quantity competition.
means (weakly) higher price and, therefore, lower consumer surplus. How-
ever, we show below that under quantity competition, for a given parameter
range, two-to-one mergers can be welfare improving; the increase in profits
dominate the fall in consumer surplus.
Proposition 1 For the parameter range,
(2−γ)(12−4γ−3γ2)
(24−2γ2) ≤ a ≤ 1−
γ
2 , the
total surplus increases post merger under quantity competition.
Proof. For 1 − γ ≤ a ≤ 1 − γ2 , if firms are in competition, q1 = qC1 and
q2 = qC2 . This gives
π1 =
(2− γ (1− a))2
(4− γ2)2
and π2 =
(2 (1− a)− γ)2
(4− γ2)2
. (12)
The resulting consumer surplus is
CS =
¡
4− 3γ2
¢
(1− a)2 + 2 (1− a) γ3 + 4− 3γ2
2 (γ + 2)2 (2− γ)2
. (13)
On the other hand, for the merged entity, Q1 = 12 and Q2 = 0. The
merged firm profit is equal to 14 where the consumer surplus is equal to
1
8 .
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The total surplus post merger increases if
3
8
≥ (2− γ (1− a))
2
(4− γ2)2
+
(2 (1− a)− γ)2
(4− γ2)2
+
¡
4− 3γ2
¢
(1− a)2 + 2 (1− a) γ3 + 4− 3γ2
2 (γ + 2)2 (2− γ)2
. (14)
This holds for
a ≥
(2− γ)
¡
12− 4γ − 3γ2
¢
(24− 2γ2) . (15)
Finally, note that
1− γ ≤
(2− γ)
¡
12− 4γ − 3γ2
¢
(24− 2γ2) ≤ 1−
γ
2
. (16)
For 1− γ ≤ a ≤ 1 − γ2 , the total market output decreases post merger,
qC1 + q
C
2 <
1
2 , and the average market up increases as¡
p1
¡
qC1 , q
C
2
¢
− c1
¢ qC1
qC1 + q
C
2
+
¡
p2
¡
qC1 , q
C
2
¢
− c1
¢ qC2
qC1 + q
C
2
>
α1 + c1
2
− c1,
where p1
¡
qC1 , q
C
2
¢
and p2
¡
qC1 , q
C
2
¢
are the prevailing market prices when
firms set quantities equal to qC1 and q
C
2 respectively.
Therefore, consumer surplus decreases. The possibility of welfare gain
comes from the efficiency gain of shutting down production of the high cost
product. It follows that there is welfare gain only if the asymmetry between
firms is sufficiently large.
As emphasised previously, for a > 1− γ2 , firm 2 is so relatively inefficient
that in either duopoly competition or post-merger, q2 = 0. A merger of the
two firms in this case has no effect on market outcomes.
The possibility of a welfare enhancing merger only occurs in Case 1
where both firms produce positive amounts if they are in competition while
the merged entity only produces good 1. The efficiency gain from shutting
down the inefficient production outweighs the loss resulting from a higher
market price.
Note that the band for a welfare increasing merger is equal to
∆ = 1− γ
2
−
(2− γ)
¡
12− 4γ − 3γ2
¢
(24− 2γ2) . (17)
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As the products become closer substitutes, the parameter range for welfare
enhancing merger widens:
∂∆
∂γ
=
¡
γ4 − 32γ2 + 48
¢
(12− γ2)2
≥ 0. (18)
Since homogenous good Cournot competition is a special case of our dif-
ferentiated products framework with γ = 1, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1 For homogenous good Cournot competition, a merger between
duopolists yields higher social welfare if 522 ≤ a ≤
1
2 .
While two-to-one mergers can be welfare enhancing under quantity com-
petition, the next section shows that this is not the case for price competi-
tion.
4 Price competition
From the inverse demand curves given in Equations 1 and 2, we obtain the
demand curves q1 =
(α1−p1)−γ(α2−p2)
(1−γ2) and q2 =
(α2−p2)−γ(α1−p1)
(1−γ2) . The firm’s
optimisation problem can be written as maxpi (pi − ci) qi. For p1 > c1 and
p2 > c2, this yields the following best response functions:
p1 =
α1 + c1 − γ (α2 − p2)
2
and p2 =
α2 + c2 − γ (α1 − p1)
2
. (19)
This yields the interior solutions
pB1 =
2α1 + 2c1 − γ2α1 − γ (1− a)
(2 + γ) (2− γ) and p
B
2 =
2α2 + 2c2 − γ2α2 − γ
(2 + γ) (2− γ) . (20)
Note that the assumption a ≥ 0 implies that p1 − c1 ≥ p2 − c2.
In contrast to quantity setting game, for differentiated Bertrand, the
efficient firm may be able to charge a low enough price to drive the other
firm out of the market even if a < 1− γ2 . This will occur when q2 ≤ 0 or
(α2 − p2)− γ (α1 − p1)
(1− γ2) ≤ 0. (21)
This holds for
p2 ≥ α2 − γ (α1 − p1) . (22)
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To enforce this price below c2, firm 1 needs to choose a price such that:
p1 ≤ α1 −
1− a
γ
. (23)
When p1 ≤ α1 − 1−aγ , q2 = 0. For q2 = 0, the unconstrained profit
maximising price for firm 1 is p1 = α1+c12 . Therefore, in this case, firm 1’s
best reply is to charge p1 = min
n
α1+c1
2 , α1 −
1−a
γ
o
.
For firm 2, being the inefficient firm, it charges according to the best re-
sponse function specified above or if the best response prescribes below mar-
ginal cost pricing, it sets p2 = c2. That is, it charges p2 = max
n
c2,
α2+c2−γ(α1−p1)
2
o
.
The kink in the best response occurs when
c2 =
α2 + c2 − γ (α1 − p1)
2
or p1 =
γα1 − (1− a)
γ
. (24)
Note that
α1 + c1
2
≤ γα1 − (1− a)
γ
if a ≥ 1− γ
2
. (25)
Therefore, as under quantity competition, for a ≥ 1− γ2 , firm 1 acts as
an unconstrained monopoly and charges p1 = α1+c12 and p2 − c2 = q2 = 0.
For 1− γ
2−γ2 ≤ a ≤ 1−
γ
2 , the equilibrium is that
p1 = α1 −
1− a
γ
and p2 − c2 = q2 = 0. (26)
Firm 1 charges a price just low enough to drive firm 2 out of the market.
Zanchettin (2006) terms the pricing behaviour in this parameter range the
limit-pricing equilibrium. Note that in this parameter range, for quantity
competition, both firms produce positive output. The ability of firm 1 to
exercise limit pricing is the key for Zanchettin’s result that the efficient firm
prefers price competition.
For a < 1 − γ
2−γ2 , we have the usual interior solution for differentiated
Bertrand with the equilibrium p1 = pB1 and p2 = p
B
2 . We distinguish differ-
ent cases by if the equilibrium outcome is given by interior solution, corner
solution, or limit pricing behaviour. The different cases are plotted in the
following diagram.
4.1 Welfare Results
While two-to-one mergers can be welfare enhancing under quantity compe-
tition, the next result shows that this is not the case for price competition.
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Figure 2: Output equilibirum in (γ, a) space under price competition.
Proposition 2 When goods are substitutes, a merger from duopoly to monopoly
always reduces total welfare if firms compete in prices.
Proof. Case 1:1− γ
2−γ2 ≤ a ≤ 1−
γ
2 :
If firms 1 and 2 are in competition, p1 = α1 − 1−aγ , π1 =
(γ+a−1)(1−a)
γ2 ,
and p2−c2 = q2 = 0. Consumer surplus is CS = (1−a)
2
2γ2 . For the the merged
entity, since setting price is the same as setting quantity, the equilibrium is
the same as the corresponding case for quantity competition, Q1 = 12 and
Q2 = 0.
Total surplus goes down post merger if
3
8
≤ (γ + a− 1) (1− a)
γ2
+
(1− a)2
2γ2
. (27)
This holds since in this case
(2a+ 3γ − 2) (2a+ γ − 2) ≤ 0. (28)
Case 2: 1− γ ≤ a ≤ 1− γ
2−γ2 :
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If firms 1 and 2 are in competition, p1 = pB1 and p2 = p
B
2 . This gives
π1 =
¡
aγ − γ − γ2 + 2
¢2
(γ + 2)2 (2− γ)2 (1− γ2)
and π2 =
¡
aγ2 − γ − γ2 − 2a+ 2
¢2
(γ + 2)2 (2− γ)2 (1− γ2)
. (29)
Consumer surplus is
CS =
a2
¡
4− 3γ2
¢
− 2 (1− γ) (2 + γ)2 a+ 2 (1− γ) (2 + γ)2
2 (γ + 2)2 (2− γ)2 (1 + γ) (1− γ)
. (30)
The merged entity produces Q1 = 12 and Q2 = 0.
The total surplus goes down post merger if
3
8
≤
¡
aγ − γ − γ2 + 2
¢2
(γ + 2)2 (2− γ)2 (γ + 1) (1− γ)
+
¡
aγ2 − γ − γ2 − 2a+ 2
¢2
(γ + 2)2 (2− γ)2 (γ + 1) (1− γ)
+
a2
¡
4− 3γ2
¢
− 2 (1− γ) (2 + γ)2 a+ 2 (1− γ) (2 + γ)2
2 (γ + 2)2 (2− γ)2 (1 + γ) (1− γ)
. (31)
This holds since
4
¡
2γ4 − 9γ2 + 12
¢
a2 + 8 (1− γ) (2γ − 3) (γ + 2)2 a
− (1− γ)
¡
16γ − 9γ2 + 3γ3 − 12
¢
(γ + 2)2
≥ 0. (32)
Case 3: a ≤ 1− γ:
If firms 1 and 2 are in competition, p1 = pB1 and p2 = p
B
2 . The merged
entity produces Q1 = Q∗1 and Q2 = Q
∗
2 as given in Equation 5.
The total surplus goes down post merger if
1− 2γ (1− a) + (1− a)2
4 (1− γ) (1 + γ) +
(1− a)2 − 2γ (1− a) + 1
8 (1 + γ) (1− γ)
≤
¡
aγ − γ − γ2 + 2
¢2
(γ + 2)2 (2− γ)2 (γ + 1) (1− γ)
+
¡
aγ2 − γ − γ2 − 2a+ 2
¢2
(γ + 2)2 (2− γ)2 (γ + 1) (1− γ)
+
a2
¡
4− 3γ2
¢
− 2 (1− γ) (2 + γ)2 a+ 2 (1− γ) (2 + γ)2
2 (γ + 2)2 (2− γ)2 (1 + γ) (1− γ)
. (33)
Or if
γ
¡
12− 5γ2
¢
a2+2 (1− γ) (4− 3γ) (γ + 2)2 a−2 (1− γ) (4− 3γ) (γ + 2)2 ≤ 0.
(34)
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This holds for
a ≤
− (1− γ) (4− 3γ) (γ + 2)2 +
q
(1− γ) (3γ + 4) (4− 3γ) (γ + 1) (γ − 2)2 (γ + 2)2
γ (12− 5γ2) .
(35)
Since −(1−γ)(4−3γ)(γ+2)
2+
√
(1−γ)(3γ+4)(4−3γ)(γ+1)(γ−2)2(γ+2)2
γ(12−5γ2) ≥ 1 − γ, total
welfare always goes down post merger in this case.
As pointed out by Zanchettin (2006), the efficient firm produces more
under price competition than under quantity competition over the entire
parameter space. This is the most apparent in the limit pricing range where
the inefficient firm is driven out of the market under price competition while
it remains active under quantity competition. Therefore, the efficiency gain
from a merger is lower under price competition and not sufficient to outweigh
the decline in consumer surplus post merger.
5 Complementary Goods
When the two goods are complements, for the merged firm, the first order
conditions with respect to good i increases in the quantity of good j. If the
firms compete in quantities, the best responses are upward sloping. There
is no corner solution and in equilibrium Q1 = Q∗1, Q2 = Q
∗
2, q1 = q
C
1 , and
q2 = qC2 as given in Equations 5 and 9.
When firms compete in prices, similarly, there is no corner solution and
both firms produce positive amounts in equilibrium. Note that pB2 > c2 for
γ < 0.
Remark 1 When goods are complements, the inefficient firm always pro-
duces positive output in equilibrium. Both industry profit and consumer
surplus go up after the merger.
When goods are complements, firms produce too little since they do not
take into consideration the positive externality their increased production
has on the other firm. Therefore, after the merger, once the externality is
internalised, production of each good increases and industry profit increases.
Consumer surplus also increases due to expanded output. Note that for this
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to hold, we do not require that goods are perfect complements. This is true
even for an arbitrarily small degree of complementarity.
Finally, the welfare comparison between price and quantity competition
for the two firms has been analysed by Zanchettin (2006) for the case of
substitute goods. Zanchettin found that price competition could give the
efficient firm higher profit if the cost difference is high and the products are
close substitutes. Next we extend his analysis to the case of complements.
Remark 2 Both firms as well as consumers prefer price competition to
quantity competition when goods are complements.
Proof. See Appendix.
When goods are complements, the prices are higher, and quantity pro-
duced lower, under quantity competition than under price competition. The
ranking of the output under different competition modes is: qCi < qi
¡
pBi
¢
<
Qi, where i = 1, 2, qCi represents the interior solution when firms compete
in quantity, qi
¡
pBi
¢
is the output level under price competition given that
the equilibrium price is qBi , and Qi is the output for the merged entity.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we develop the analytical condition for a merger of duopolists
to be welfare enhancing if firms compete in quantities. A merger between
goods which are substitutes increases social welfare if the cost difference is
substantial. Furthermore, the parameter range for the merger to be welfare
enhancing widens if the products are closer substitutes. If firms compete
in prices, on the other hand, a merger between duopolists is never welfare
improving. Finally, we show that mergers are always welfare improving for
any (even very small) degree of complementarity.
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7 Appendix
Proof. of Remark 2: Firm 1 gets higher profit in the price game if¡
aγ − γ − γ2 + 2
¢2
(γ + 2)2 (2− γ)2 (γ + 1) (1− γ)
≥ (2− γ (1− a))
2
(4− γ2)2
.
This holds since a2γ + 2 (1− γ) a− 2 (1− γ) ≤ 0. Similarly, firm 2 gets
higher profit in the price setting game.
Consumer surplus is higher in the price game if¡
3γ2 − 4
¢
a2 + 2 (1− γ) (γ + 2)2 a− 2 (1− γ) (γ + 2)2
2 (γ + 2)2 (2− γ)2 (γ + 1) (γ − 1)
≥
¡
4− 3γ2
¢
a2 − 2 (1 + γ) (2− γ)2 a+ 2 (1 + γ) (2− γ)2
2 (γ + 2)2 (2− γ)2
.
This holds since ¡
3γ2 − 4
¢
a2 + 2 (1− γ)
¡
4− γ2 + 2γ
¢
a
−2 (1− γ)
¡
4− γ2 + 2γ
¢
≤ 0.
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